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This essay addresses the interaction between policies of targeted killing and wider social forces, 
particularly technology, through three recently published books.  I suggest that while Ian 
Shaw's Predator Empire does well to draw attention to the enclosing tendency of contemporary 
nonhuman environments and means of technological control – particularly drones, Kyle 
Grayson's Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing provides a necessary contextualization of these 
technological transformations by emphasizing the cultural-political underpinnings of policies 
of targeted killing and of the assemblage of technologies into such policies.  These perspectives 
are replicated in Eyal Weizman's Hollow Land, who describes the political and strategic 
manipulation of space to implement Israeli non-territorial occupation in Gaza and the West 
Bank. I conclude by suggesting that these three works provide renewed avenues to reflect on 
the normative and conceptual impacts of lethal drones and other novel warfighting 
technologies, as well as on the relation between state violence and normalcy. 
Introduction 
 In recent years, the lethal drone has provided a focal point in International Relations 
scholarship for reevaluating practices, norms, and strategic doctrines in warfare.  Between 
histories of targeted killing,1 works relating the use of lethal drones to wider practices in 
warfighting,2 and theorizations of contemporary warfare centering on a shift to the containment 
 
1 Markus Gunneflo, Targeted Killing: A Legal and Political History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2016); Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations. 
(Random House, 2018). 
2 Bianca Baggiarini, ‘Drone Warfare and the Limits of Sacrifice’, Journal of International Political 
Theory 11, no. 1 (February 2015): 128–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/1755088214555597; Lisa Parks and Caren 
Kaplan, eds., Life in the Age of Drone Warfare (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017); Alison J. Williams, 
‘Enabling Persistent Presence? Performing the Embodied Geopolitics of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Assemblage’, Political Geography 30, no. 7 (September 2011): 381–90, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.08.002; Matthew Evangelista and Henry Shue, eds., The American Way of 
Bombing: Changing Ethical and Legal Norms, from Flying Fortresses to Drones, 2014. 
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of risk and the rise of global policing,3 there is wide consensus that the impact of remote-
controlled aircraft reaches far beyond narrow strategic considerations or strict questions of 
ethics of use of force.4  Accordingly, it is the wider reshaping of society engineered by (drone-
led) targeted killing campaigns that is the focus of the three books under review here.   Eyal 
Weizman's Hollow Land,5 Ian Shaw's Predator Empire and Kyle Grayson's Cultural Politics of 
Targeted Killing all share, among others, a macroscopic perspective on the effects of state 
violence on political life and on structures of power and domination.  While Weizman provides 
a rich account of Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank, Shaw and Grayson provide 
wider-spectrum discussions of the interplay between liberalism, capitalism, and the 
institutionalization of targeted violence. In all three cases – sometimes more explicitly (in Shaw 
and Grayson), warfare is discussed as being produced and sustained by – and impacting on – 
wider forces in society and biopolitical endeavours to police, regulate, and constrain behaviour 
and life processes. 
 Nevertheless, despite this general agreement on targeted killing's reshaping of political 
society, all three books also provide distinct outlooks on the relations between technology, 
modes of violence, and political life.  While Shaw emphasizes the role of non-human mediators 
in constituting the world, Grayson highlights the embeddedness of technology and violence in 
cultural and political constructions.  Weizman, meanwhile, highlights how technological 
means of surveillance can be used to transform spatial conceptions, systematize the inflicting 
of violence and produce a "system"6 of control. 
 
3 Michael Dillon, The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live (London: Routledge, 2009); 
Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsäter, ‘War as Perpetual Policing’, in The Character of War in the 21st Century, ed. 
Caroline Holmqvist-Jonsäter and Christopher Coker (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 103–18; Mark 
Neocleous, War Power, Police Power (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014). 
4 Kyle Grayson, Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing: On Drones, Counter-Insurgency, and Violence 
(New York: Routledge, 2016), 3 See also Chapter 2.  
5 Hollow Land was initially published in 2007.  It is included here on the account of its reissue in 2017, 
accompanied by a new preface. 
6 Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation (London: Verso, 2017), xvi. 
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In this essay, I discuss these three works' account of the role of technology in producing 
and mediating political violence.7  I point first to a fundamental debate between Ian Shaw and 
Kyle Grayson on the role of technology and the "non-human" in the constitution of 
assemblages of targeted killing, suggesting that Shaw fails to acknowledge the cultural-
political underpinnings of technologies of violence.  I then examine Weizman's presentation of 
Israeli occupation in light of Predator Empire and The Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing, 
suggesting that Weizman's account of the system of Israeli surveillance and control – while 
highlighting features present in both Grayson and Shaw's accounts – suggests a greater human 
agency in directing technological violence than Shaw accounts for.  I close by situating this 
debate within wider trends in the study of drone warfare and targeted killing. 
Predator Empire, Culture, and State Violence 
Predator Empire is predicated on the foundation that non-human structures and 
elements influence the conduct of International Relations to – at least – the same extent as 
human elements.  Shaw's account devotes significant attention to the non-human environments 
which are constructed by technology and which condition human relations, as "Our 
anthropology, our very human existence, is shaped by the artificial environments, big and 
small, we carve out from the planet."8  Shaw – drawing from Peter Sloterdijk's conception of 
spheres – contends that technology perpetuates and accentuates constant historical trends 
towards "enclosure", that is, the constraining of human life for the perpetuation of unequal 
social relations.9 What is new in contemporary globalized society, however, is that the 
mediation of human relations is now predominantly non-human, effectuated through 
technological means.  New technologies of state power – in particular the armed drone – push 
 
7  All three authors address technological violence writ large; the drone, while a catalyst for the interplay 
of violence and society, is a manifestation of wider trends, and not the originator of wholly new processes.  
8 Ian G. R Shaw, Predator Empire: Drone Warfare and Full Spectrum Dominance (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 2. 
9 Shaw, 32.  
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tendencies to enclosure and nonhuman mediation to their paroxysm: "The desire to enclose the 
world in a single immunitary configuration may be as old as empire, but the drone is a 
technology that can begin to realize this ambition."10 The world is now a world in which 
humans are "contained by artificial domes and […] artificial drones."11 
In Shaw's materialist structural account – inspired in part by Bruno Latour's Actor-
Network Theory,12 technology acts as "an existential force"13 in transforming environments 
inhabited by humans.  Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in common conceptions of 
security, where "The health of communities is secondary to the feeding of the war machine.  In 
other words, security is seen as a nonhuman rather than human condition."14  As suggested by 
the title, the American MQ-1 "Predator" drone plays a central role in Shaw's account: it is the 
technology which enables the definitive enclosure of humanity through its unparalleled 
capabilities for surveillance and targeted killing: "The wager this book takes is that the military 
drone is not simply a weapon but a geopolitical actor that seeks to enclose the world by 
producing overlapping, electromagnetic, civilizatory domes."15 
However, Shaw repeatedly conflates his concept of the Predator Empire, American 
campaigns of drone-led targeted killing, and the drone as a technological artefact.  Shaw 
regularly makes little difference between the technology – the remote-piloted aircraft – and his 
conception of the imperialistic condition of human enclosure predicated on surveillance and 
policing – the Predator Empire – in which the drone aircraft is embedded, but of which it forms 
merely a part.  In other words, Shaw uses drones simultaneously as technological catalysts (or 
"agents"), as metaphors (through their use in targeted killing) for the increasingly dominating 
 
10 Shaw, 256. 
11 Shaw, 30. 
12 Shaw, 16. 
13 Shaw, 40. 
14 Shaw, 249. 
15 Shaw, 46. 
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biopolitical power of the state over life and death, and as examples of the unwavering and 
pervasive reach of surveillance and policing.  'Drone', as such, is a slippery category, which 
Shaw deliberately treats as a fuzzy and indeterminate concept. 
Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing, against Shaw's approach focused on the agential 
role of technology, engages in a critique of liberalism inspired by Foucault, which puts cultural 
factors at the foreground.  Grayson, against approaches such as Giorgio Agamben's, Derek 
Gregory's, or Andrew Neal's,16 argues that the resort to targeted killing is not an aberration 
enabled by a state of exception – however permanent – but rather an outcome made possible – 
but not necessary – by liberalism itself.17  Therefore, he investigates the cultural, political, and 
social assemblages which make targeted killing a viable option compatible with liberal politics; 
at the heart of his work lies the contention that "The logic that contributes to the possibility of 
targeted killing is therefore reflective of longer standing changes to the ways in which 
mechanisms for governing have been viewed by those who govern."18 
As such, Grayson examines aspects of cultural frameworks which enable targeted 
killing.  Culture, in his view, is a paradoxical force, both transforming and traditionalistic, 
which plays a central role in defining human relations.  Most importantly, Grayson argues, 
culture contributes to defining the problematizations to which perceived solutions, such as 
targeted killing campaigns, respond.19  If, as Grayson (and Shaw) argues, security threats are 
not given but constructed, then the cultural construction of these threats can explain the 
selection of certain forms of violence as solutions, and provide a way to deconstruct the 
"assemblages" upon which this violence is founded. 
 
16 See for instance Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); 
Derek Gregory, ‘Vanishing Points’, in Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and Political Violence, ed. Derek 
Gregory and Allan Richard Pred (New York: Routledge, 2007), 205–36; Andrew W. Neal, Exceptionalism and 
the Politics of Counter-Terrorism: Liberty, Security and the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 2011). 
17 Grayson, Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing, 2. 
18 Grayson, 7. 
19 Grayson, 13. 
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These "assemblages", namely ensembles of related components through which 
properties emerge which are not present in any individual part,20 provide a sharp point of 
contrast between Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing and Predator Empire.  Grayson 
discusses at length the assemblage of both human and non-human cultural-political elements, 
while Shaw agrees that a technological force "always already necessitates a larger 
sociotechnical assemblage."21  Where they differ, however, is on the constructing or 
constructed role of technology within these assemblages.  For Shaw, a technology such as the 
armed drone, as a non-human agent, actively shapes the environment and "must be seen, 
therefore, as a geopolitical actor."22  Technology is primary, and cultural practices such as 
targeted killing arise as a result of technological shifts.23 Just as "Empires would be impossible 
without the infrastructures that anchor their power relations to the landscape,"24 "Aerial 
technologies now hack the human lifeworld from the skies in order to capture, digitize, and 
police it."25  The Predator Empire and the violence sustaining it arise primarily as a result of 
technological changes, most prominently the appearance of the drone. 
Grayson, meanwhile, takes issue with Shaw's materialist account, criticizing 
"technological rationalism"26 which presents violence as produced by technological 
assemblages and "a set of shifts that emerge from adopting it."27  Grayson's account rather 
"emphasise[s] relations amongst component parts, the incorporation of disparate elements 
including the non-human, power relations, plasticity, and the importance of discourse." It is, as 
such, centred on "the importance of cultural mediation to liberal forms of rule," rather than 
 
20 Grayson, 15. 
21 Nick Srnicek, in Shaw, Predator Empire, 41. 
22 Shaw, 14. 
23 Shaw does argue that such shifts are nonlinear, although he accepts the designation of "nonlinear 
technological determinism. Shaw, 41. 
24 Shaw, 11. 
25 Shaw, 10. 
26 Grayson, Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing, 17.  Grayson here points at "the new materialisms that 
have emerged from actor-network theory and object-oriented ontologies," both of which are explicitly referred to 
in Predator Empire. 
27 Nick Srnicek, in Shaw, Predator Empire, 41. 
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technological mediations.28  Specific assemblages of violence are not determined by non-
human environments and technological agents, but made more probable by cultural 
constructions which underpin the practice of violence.  Against Shaw, Grayson notes that the 
desire to transfer warmaking capabilities to machines – among them drones – is itself 
predicated upon cultural foundations derived from economic organisation and market 
optimisation.29  
In designing his highly idealized conception of the Predator Empire, Shaw tends to 
overstate the impact of technology on society, downplaying the cultural factors which shape 
technology.  Shaw evacuates the human from the Predator Empire so much that he ignores the 
cultural – and therefore human – forces which shape the development of technology.  In 
contrast, Alison Williams, analyzing the loitering capacity of drones – which, for Shaw, is a 
key part of their role in enabling the Predator Empire – considers "the military aircraft as an 
assemblage that bends human and machine elements to produce one combat entity."30  This is 
not a case, in other words, of a machine replacing the human, but of combining human and 
technological characteristics; later, Williams argues that the privileging of vision is caused by 
the "tension" of human and machine, in which human limitations restrict machine capabilities.  
The human element, in summary, persistently disrupts the fantasy of technological supremacy, 
contra Shaw's vision of technological determinism.31 
 
 
28 Grayson, Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing, 199, emphasis added. 
29 Grayson, 116. 
It may be interesting to consider Christopher Fuller's history of the development of the Predator drone, 
which suggests that the armed drone (and thus the technological capability) was developed after the policy of 
counter-insurgency through targeted killing had been elaborated.  See Christopher J Fuller, See It/Shoot It: The 
Secret History of the CIA’s Lethal Drone Program (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).   
30 Williams, ‘Enabling Persistent Presence?’, 384. 
31 Williams, 385–86. 
 8 
Targeted Killing in the Hollow Land 
Unlike Predator Empire and Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing, Hollow Land 
possesses a clear empirical focus, namely the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories.  That 
being said, the relevance of Weizman's work is as much theoretical and methodological as it is 
historical and empirical.  In this following section, I introduce Eyal Weizman's methodological 
approach, before comparing his account of the violence of Israeli occupation to the approaches 
of Shaw and Grayson. 
At first glance, Weizman espouses a similarly biopolitical approach to that of Shaw and 
Grayson.  In the new preface from 2017, he thus describes the siege of Gaza as "a giant and 
unparalleled exercise in population control,"32 emphasising the extent to which strategic and 
political objectives depend on the regulation of life patterns.  Weizman, however, pursues his 
investigation of the biopolitics of Israeli occupation through what he terms "forensic 
architecture,"33 that is, the use of architectural concepts to find evidence of embedded power 
relations.  Power, for Weizman, is encoded in the physical construction of the environment; 
accordingly, the Israeli system of control manifests itself in its reshaping of buildings, cities, 
networks, and landscapes.34  While Shaw describes "the architecture for a forever drone war"35 
through domes and enclosures, Weizman approaches political geography through layers and 
networks.   
Against cartographic geographies which have "until recently almost exclusively [been] 
associated with the mechanisms of colonial power,"36 he advocates complex, volumetric37 
geographies in which political domination can sacrifice surface occupation in favour of control 
 
32 Weizman, Hollow Land, xiii. 
33 Weizman, xxii. 
34 Weizman, xvi. 
35 Shaw, Predator Empire, 39. 
36 Weizman, Hollow Land, 261. 
37 Stuart Elden, ‘Secure the Volume: Vertical Geopolitics and the Depth of Power’, Political Geography 
34 (May 2013): 35–51, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2012.12.009. 
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of the underground layer, as well as the enveloping airspace.  Network thinking, meanwhile, 
reflects the fact that "Temporary lines of engagement marked by makeshift boundaries are not 
limited to the edges of political space but exist throughout its depths,"38 a fact made evident by 
chapter 2 on Ariel Sharon's conception of defence in depth and of settlements as a form of 
control.  Forensic architecture, therefore, functions in two ways: it reflects the embedding of 
power relations in built structures and infrastructure, and it emphasises how the political is 
constructed in and through the "medium" of space.39  In other words, whoever controls the 
physical environment controls society and life.40 
Israel's Predator Empire 
Hollow Land reflects several key elements of Shaw's Predator Empire, not least the 
notion of encirclement and enclosure through a network of bases which sacrifice physical 
presence in favour of technological surveillance.  Weizman's key contention is that, essentially, 
the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 represented not an abdication of control 
but a substitution of physical presence for technological domination.  Just as Shaw argues that 
"The dronification of state violence embodies a form of nonterritorial occupation,"41 so 
Weizman argues that Israel has sought to segment Palestinian society through a network of 
settlements supplemented by aerial domination.42  Weizman thus describes, for instance, how 
Ariel Sharon decided to cut boulevards through Palestinian refugee camps ("design undertaken 
by destruction") in order to combat Palestinian insurgency, notably by allowing the Israeli 
Defence Force to isolate and purge sections of camps.43  For Shaw, the Predator Empire "see[s] 
drone warfare as part of a wider project to surveil and enclose the human species" without 
 
38 Weizman, Hollow Land, 4. 
39 Weizman, 6–7. 
40 A third facet of forensic architecture discussed in the postscript is the use of architectural techniques 
to gather evidence of oppression, violence, and war crimes.  Weizman, 259–63. 
41 Shaw, Predator Empire, 256. 
42 See particularly Chapter 1, on the architectural politics in Jerusalem post-1967. 
43 Weizman, Hollow Land, 70. 
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physical architecures.44 In Weizman's account, Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
does just that. 
Weizman and Shaw both highlight the "aerial dimension of state power"45 through 
which the world is rendered as a "grid of targets" for potential elimination.46  Equally important, 
however, is the network of physical bases which allow for the abdication of control of the 
surface.  In Hollow Land, this network is provided by legal and tacitly tolerated Israeli 
settlements which are connected by roads, disrupting Arab territory and making 
communication difficult, if not impossible.  In Predator Empire, similarly, Shaw notes how 
American imperialism has forfeited large bases in favour of scattered "lily pads" from which 
drones can be launched to reach any point of the earth.47  In many ways, therefore, Israel's 
control of the Occupied Territories acted as a "laboratory" for the occupation of the world.48 
That being said, Weizman's depiction of Israeli occupation puts into focus a key figure 
which is absent from Shaw's account: the architect.  The Israeli system of control, architectural 
in nature, was actively built by architects, namely – given Israeli militarization49 – by a number 
of "architect/general[s]" such as Sharon: "For Sharon the architect/general, politics was war as 
much as war was politics and both were exercised in space making."50  Technology, in other 
words, for Weizman, does not direct the transformation of geopolitics, but rather is marshalled 
in the service of pre-existing political, military, and geopolitical aims.  Weizman sees 
continuity between pre-2005 and post-2005 Israeli domination: the bomber, helicopter, and 
drone may have replaced the bulldozer, but the objective - the control of population – and the 
means to achieve it – the destruction of homes and the cordoning off of no-go areas – remain 
 
44 Shaw, Predator Empire, 6–7. 
45 Shaw, 3. 
46 Shaw, 61. 
47 Shaw, 37–38. 
48 Weizman, Hollow Land, 241. 
49 Weizman, 253. 
50 Weizman, 84. 
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sensibly the same.51  The switch to drone-dominant policing transformed occupation, but did 
not change its nature: "The geography of occupation thus completed a ninety-degree turn: the 
imaginary 'orient' – the exotic object of colonization – was no longer beyond the horizon, but 
now under the vertical tyranny of a western airborne civilization that remotely managed its 
most sophisticated and advanced technological platforms, sensors and munitions in the spaces 
above."52  In other words, occupation may no longer have a human face and may be mediated 
through non-human means, but it is very much masterminded, designed and controlled by 
humans. 
The Cultural Politics of Israeli Targeted Killing 
Hollow Land demonstrates the extent to which targeted killing by Israel is embedded 
in a project wider than its stated aims, namely the policing of excluded modes of life.  Far 
beyond its stated military aim, it is engineered to maintain Israeli control by disrupting and 
governing quotidian life in the Occupied Territories in order to thoroughly eliminate risk.53  
Grayson, citing Katharyn Mitchell, notes how, following the Cold War, the dominant 
conception of security was transformed from containment to the administration and 
management of danger.54  Among others, he discusses the destruction of homes as a violation 
of sacred spaces which has far-reaching disorienting consequences, including psychological, 
social, and economic disruption.55  This reflects Weizman's account of the Israeli occupation, 
which (he argues) very much seeks to eliminate danger by reformatting life through the 
reshaping of its social environment, notably through the deliberate destruction of homes.   
Overall, Weizman's assertion that Israel and Palestine constitute "the world's largest 
laboratory for airborne assassinations"56 lends credence to Cultural Politics of Targeted 
 
51 Weizman, 240. 
52 Weizman, 237. 
53 Grayson, Cultural Politics of Targeted Killing, 170. 
54 Grayson, 172. 
55 Grayson, 191. 
56 Weizman, Hollow Land, 241. 
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Killings' privileging of cultural factors in the development of targeted killing doctrines.  As 
Weizman argues, the implementation of targeted killing by Israel as a method of airborne 
occupation relies not only on the availability of technological means, but also on popular 
support and on the development of legal arguments justifying it.57  Furthermore, once targeted 
killings have become a possible solution, they rely on a self-perpetuating logic, according to 
which they become the solution to all sorts of problems.58  In other words, the large-scale 
implementation of targeted killing campaigns relies on a cultural decision in their favour, and 
a reconfiguration of the cultural underpinnings of security.  
Conclusion 
Kyle Grayson, Ian Shaw, and Eyal Weizman's books address the crucial question of the 
interaction between war, political violence, and wider social practices, accounting for ways in 
which life patterns become both sources and objects of violence.  Warmaking does not occur 
in a vacuum, but is shaped and shapes the way life and politics are conducted.  The three books 
under review continue trends in critical International Relations, discussing both how political 
violence emerges out of cultural processes (Grayson) and how war transforms social relations 
(Shaw), with Weizman's Hollow Land providing an applied illustration of both.  The call to 
contextualise warfare and technologies of violence (particularly lethal drones) in wider 
political life provides a potentially fruitful avenue for future research, evading narrow 
questions of strict legality and decontextualized strategic discussions of the effectiveness of 
political violence and counter-insurgency. 
The disagreement here between Grayson and Shaw can be linked to a wider debate in 
the study of drone warfare, namely how a new technological weapon – the lethal drone – 
impacts existing norms and conceptions of war.  Along with Shaw – who argues that the drone 
 
57 Weizman, 245–46. 
58 Weizman, 248; See also Bergman, Rise and Kill First, xix–xxi. 
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is a "geopolitical actor" enclosing humanity – one may find authors such as Grégoire 
Chamayou59 and Hugh Gusterson60, who argue for the radical novelty of drone warfare – 
technology triggering fundamental changes in the practice of violence.  Conversely, Stephanie 
Carvin61, Sven Lindqvist62 and Chris Fuller63 adopt historical perspectives, explaining how 
lethal drones were deliberately reconciled with existing norms, be it those concerning long-
range artillery (Carvin), naval warfare (Lindqvist), or assassination (Fuller) – a position closer 
to Grayson's.  All three authors here bring perspectives which speak directly to this debate, 
which remains crucial as scholars grapple with new forms of war involving new technologies. 
Finally, these three books question the meaning of normality and abnormality in the 
exercise of state violence.  Grayson argues against conceptions of targeted killing as aberrations 
or exceptions to normalcy, while Shaw argues for continuity in the analysis of war and policing, 
domestically and abroad, suggesting the need for genuinely planetary geopolitics of violence.  
Weizman, meanwhile, highlights a situation in which regulation by violence has become the 
exceptionally normal situation – territories existing in a state of twilight which excludes any 
stable order.  The paradox of this state of occupation is perhaps best summarized by Peter Stirk: 
"Military occupation pushes sovereignty to the point at which its existence and meaning are 
precarious.  All that is left is a hollow shell whose significance lies in a negative fact: the 
occupier is not sovereign."64  While Weizman, emphasising the spatial underpinnings of this 
violent governance, writes of a "hollow land" rather than a "hollow shell," the significance here 
 
59 Grégoire Chamayou, Théorie du drone (Paris: La Fabrique, 2013). 
60 Hugh Gusterson, Drone: Remote Control Warfare (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017). 
61 Stephanie Carvin, ‘Getting Drones Wrong’, The International Journal of Human Rights 19, no. 2 (17 
February 2015): 127–41, https://doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2014.991212; see also Stephanie Carvin and Michael 
John Williams, Law, Science, Liberalism, and the American Way of Warfare: The Quest for Humanity in Conflict, 
2015. 
62 Sven Lindqvist, A History of Bombing, trans. Linda Haverty Rugg (New York: New Press, 2001). 
63 Fuller, See It/Shoot It. 
64 Peter M. R. Stirk, The Politics of Military Occupation (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), 
230. 
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should be clear: it is increasingly impossible to distinguish state violence from peace, and to 
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